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The focus of this study is the Republic of Turkey‟s involvement in NATO with a special 
attention to Turkey‟s gradual withdrawal from NATO member countries. Additionally, this 
study will also analyze the influences of Turkey‟s maneuvers in international affairs to 
NATO‟s internal strategic concerns. After going through decades of democratization 
process, membership in NATO and great access to relations with the West that last until the 
present day, this study also offers reviews of Turkey‟s urgency and relevancy to perpetuate 
its NATO membership. The purpose of this study is to understand and identify the 
relationship between Turkey‟s international activities, Turkey‟s socio-political conditions at 
home and their effects to Turkey‟s position inside NATO. The data were collected by means 
of library research and online library research. The principle result of this study is that 
Turkey‟s entry into NATO and the drastic democratization in 1950 are all influenced by the 
international affairs in that period (after the First World War to the Cold War era). The final 
conclusion of this study is that Turkey is a less practically beneficial country for NATO now 
and NATO is no longer an essential need for Turkey, as Turkey has gained more self-
confidence internationally and thus being no longer reliant on NATO protection, inter alia it 
is more willing to risk experiments in exercising its foreign affairs. 
 




Turkey is known for its unique geographical location at the nexus of Europe and the 
Middle East. Its prominence as a secular, democratic, and Westward country emboldened 
Turkey‟s integrality to Middle Eastern, European, and U.S. foreign policy. For example,  
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Turkey has been a crucial partner in addressing the European Refugee Crisis, combating 
terrorism, and promoting democracy outside its borders. This unique role stemmed from the  
Ottoman Empire era and its predominant fascination of westernization. The desire to become 
close with the West then pushed Turkey towards reformations that happened in several 
different eras, and culminated in the establishment of Turkey as a modern, democratic  and 
secular republic in 1923.  
However, even up until now, many elements of the republic were still needed to be 
perfected if it was to follow the complete democratic ideals of the West. Without ignoring the 
internal pressures for change, Turkey‟s later shift to a more democratized and liberalized 
politics can‟t be separated from the international system during the interwar period to the 
Cold War era and Turkey‟s responses to it, which was measured by Turkey‟s foreign policies. 
One of Turkey‟s biggest achievement in establishing a special partnership with the West is its 
eventual entry to NATO in 1952. As will be elaborated later in this writing, Turkey‟s strive 
for secular, democratic, and Westward ideals often clash with its on-again, off-again 
relationship with the West and its own local culture, which has a strong Islamic appeal and 
identification with its former territories during the Ottoman era. Turkey was also not 
materially capable, something that would later become one of its obstructions to join NATO. 
However, it was also this incapability that enabled Turkey to abstain from the WW II and 
pushed Turkey towards more democratization in order to become eligible for American aid. 
Nevertheless, the Republic of Turkey‟s achievement for successful entry to NATO. 
Those changes still have a great impact in today‟s Republic of Turkey. Therefore, to place 
this development in the proper perspective, it is necessary to examine Turkey‟s 
modernization and entry to NATO from the point of view of its political history, first within 
its involvement in the international affairs of the interwar period to the Cold War era, and 
lastly within its domestic political dynamics. 
 
TURKEY IN THE COLD WAR 
 
During the Cold War era (1945-1950), Turkey was experiencing a rapid 
democratization and economic liberalization, in which American influence was undeniable. 
At least there were three reasons for this. First, Turkey‟s economy had suffered considerably 
as the result of the war. Turkey still needed to maintain a large standing army for fear of war 
with Soviet, and at the same time the İnönü government also tried to resume their economic 
development plans which had been suspended. This pushed Turkey to seek for foreign aid 
and loans, especially from the new superpowers and winners of the war (U.S.A. and Soviet 
Union) (Senem Üstün, 1997: 31-48). 
Second, Turkey and Soviet relations were deteriorating. Soviet refused to extend the 
1935 friendship treaty and gave difficult prerequisites for any renewal of it, such as giving 
away northeastern Anatolia and agreeing to utilize the Straits to guard the Black Sea. Thus, 
Turkey sought for another source of help. Turkey then made use of the U.S.-Soviet 
competition for influence. On 12 March 1947, President Truman launched his „Truman 
Doctrine‟, stipulating the U.S. to assist „free nations‟ (such as Greece and Turkey) threatened 
by both internal and external military pressures, especially communist ones. On June 1947,  
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U.S.A. put forward the Marshall Plan, an economic reconstruction program for European 
countries whose economy had collapsed as the result of WW II. Turkey was a beneficiary  
despite its unsuitability with the Plan‟s target. Indeed, Turkey fought hard for the aid, 
insisting on its strategic importance to the U.S.A and its „overwhelming military burden‟ 
before being granted the aid in 1949 (Erik J. Zürcher, 2004: 208)    
 Therefore, Turkey‟s conformity to the American democracy and free enterprise ideals 
could be seen as Turkey‟s way to profit fully from American support and the Marshall Plan. 
Additionally, Turkey was impressed by America as the new superpower and winner of WW 
II. Therefore, the matter of international relations also played a great part in shaping Turkey‟s 
political and economic change after 1945.  
 
TURKEY’S ENTRY TO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) 
 
 The relations among Turkey, other European countries and the U.S. had been built for 
a long time before Turkey joined NATO. The proof is Turkey‟s membership in the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation and Council of Europe and the 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OOEC), an organization set up by a 
1948 convention in Paris, that coordinated efforts to restore Europe‟s economy under U.S.‟s 
Recovery Program (Marshall Plan). (OEEC 1998). 
The organization emerged from the Marshall Plan and the Conference of Sixteen 
(Conference for European Economic Co-operation). The OEEC's first objective in 1948/1949 
was to prepare the European Recovery Program which justified the American effort.(The 
Historical Archive of the European Communities 2017). Turkey‟s membership in this 
organization is a way to achieve modern Turkey and strengthen Turkey‟s relations with other 
members, which predominantly were European Countries. 
 In 1950, Turkey applied for NATO membership but found out that it was not easy. 
Adnan Menderes knew that several NATO countries, notably the Scandinavian ones, were 
opposed to Greece and Turkish membership, arguing that those countries were neither 
Atlantic nor Democratic (Zucher, 2004:235). But D. J. K. argued that the reasons of 
Scandinavian‟s disfavor of Turkey‟s entry were fear that the extension of the Treaty might 
drag them into a war in the Mediterranean (where they had little interest in) and that the 
addition of Turkey and Greece might reduce the amount of arms and equipment supplies 
from the United States. Another objection also came from British, with three main reasons 
against admitting Turkey: (1) it would destroy the conception of the Atlantic Pact as a basis 
for building an Atlantic Community as a political and economic association of nations having 
common traditions, etc.; (2) it would increase the security risks, introduce military problems 
which had no relation to the main European defence theater, and would generally disturb the 
organization which was just starting to find its feet; (3) many of the existing members would 
be strongly opposed to any extensions of their obligation to go to war (D.J.K, 1952:162–69). 
 In spite of those obstacles and objections, Turkey had its own bargaining power. U.S. 
and its allies believed the importance of having MEC (Middle-East Command) and within 
that idea, Turkey appeared to be convincing and ideal to be involved and make it happen. It 
was agreed that MEC should in effect be a NATO operational command under NATO  
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Standing Group ( eh et K.  e   lbursa, 1999: 70–102).   On 24 June, the British Chiefs of 
Staff agreed to the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO, on the understanding that 
Turkey would take its place in a Combined Allied Middle East Command, since Turkey 
would not join MEC unless it joined NATO at the same time. ( eh et K.  e   lbursa, 1999: 
70–102). Moreover, The United States air experts were strongly in favor of the admission of 
Turkey, since it refused to consider leasing air bases on its territory unless it was admitted to 
NATO. (D.J.K 1952: 163). Another Turkey‟s  trump card was its involvement in the Korean 
War, which made it possible for Turkey to become a full member of NATO on 18 February 
1952. 
During the Korean War (1950-1953), the United Nations sent an international 
expeditionary force to Korea to counter invasion from the north and asked for other 
countries‟ contributions to help. In June 1950, Turkey was one of the few countries that 
immediately offered to contribute troops (Zurcher, 2004:237). Turkey sent a 4.500-men 
brigade in October, but by the time the war was over, Turkey had sent around 25.000 soldiers 
and ended up with 6000 casualties.(Zurcher, 2004:235). Many people took that phenomenon 
as the most significant reason behind NATO‟s acceptance of Turkey as its member. 
 When Democratic Party took its winning election in Turkey, it started to modernize 
Turkey as what it had campaigned during the election. The modernization focused on 
economy and infrastructure while military was not in the priority list, unlike that of the 
Ottoman Empire. That was what Adnan Menderes announced to the Grand National 
Assembly when he read his government‟s program on 24 May 1954: 
 
We shall continue our efforts to bring our heroic army to a position consonant 
with the needs of today and capable of meeting every kind of aggression. This 
will be accomplished by using all material and moral resources in proportion to 
the strength of our economic and financial potential [Applause]. In fact, one of 
the main goals of our economic measures and development is to maintain, with 
our own means, a large army as soon as possible…As has been our practice so 
far, military appropriations will increase in proportion to the growth in our 
national income.(Feroz, 2002:124) 
 
During his era, Menderes trusted the military to the Young Officers, as the Senior 
Officer was too busy developing Turkey‟s economy. However, inside NATO, the 
character of Young Officers corps began to change. Young Officers, who were open to 
technology and the strategy of modern warfare, acquired a sense of importance and 
confidence they had never enjoyed before. They visited other countries and discussed the 
world‟s problems with officers who presented perspective different from their own. They 
became contemptuous of their own politicians who were constantly wrangling with each 
other while the country‟s problems remained unresolved. There was even some 
embarrassment when foreign officers asked about the situation in Turkey.  NATO 
deepened the division between the junior and senior officers along technological lines. 
(Feroz, 2002:124)         
 Laws passed in 1954 provided for heavy fines on journalists thought to have  
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damaged the prestige of the state or the law; several prominent journalists were 
prosecuted under this law, which was made more severe in 1956, while other laws 
substantially abridged the independence of civil servants (including university teachers) 
and judges. In 1955, critics within the DP were expelled; these critics subsequently 
formed the Freedom Party, which in 1958 merged with the CHP. In 1956, limitations 
were placed upon public meetings. (Feroz, 2002:124)    
 The years 1958–60 saw a further worsening of the economy as the government 
reluctantly introduced restrictive measures. Returns on new investment fell and inflation 
continued. Serious problems of housing and unemployment were emerging in the large 
towns, whose population had been growing annually at the rate of about 10 percent, so 
that by 1960 the urban portion of the population had risen to nearly one-third. CHP 
attacks became more bitter and the government‟s response stronger. In April 1960, the 
government ordered the army to prevent İnönü from campaigning in Kayseri and formed 
a committee to investigate the affairs of the CHP. It was widely believed that the 
government‟s next action would be to close the CHP. Student demonstrations followed, 
and martial law was declared on April 28. By then, the army had been brought directly 
into the political arena. (Feroz, 2002:124) 
 
TURKEY AND NATO 
 
Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952. From the Cold War years of the 1950s 
until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey‟s significance as a NATO member derived 
from the fact that it is situated in an area of crucial geostrategic political and economic 
importance. This significance continues in the post-Soviet period, since it borders the 
unstable and important regions of southwest Asia and the Middle East. Turkey‟s importance 
to its Western allies was underlined by the cooperative role it played during the Gulf War and 
in Afghanistan. Turkey had been welcoming NATO‟s project of enlargement in recent years. 
(Metin Herper and Nur Bilge Criss, 2009:230).  
Membership of NATO shook the old-fashioned Turkish army to its foundations. 
Younger, better trained officers who spoke English or were trained engineers, were taken 
abroad for training in other NATO countries.
 
The military, traditionally a privileged class, 
were losing buying power to the growing inflation rate as well. Regular contact through 
NATO allowed them to measure the gulf that separated them from their Western colleagues 
(Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, 2011:88). 
Misunderstandings multiplied as the Kurdish refugee crisis took hold. Despite 
decades together in the NATO alliance, the Turkish and Allied military were not getting on 
well together either (Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, 2011: 231). When the Welfare Party 
eventually came to power in July 1966, Necmettin Hoca, or „teacher‟ as he was often called, 
dropped his fiery rhetoric and abandoned his earlier opposition on such issues as Customs 
Union with Europe, Turkey‟s membership of NATO and even military co-operation with 
Israel (Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, 2011: 88). 
 
 
International Review of Humanities Studies 
www.irhs.ui.ac.id, e-ISSN: 2477-6866, p-ISSN: 2527-9416 











FOREIGN RELATIONS: ATLANTIC TURKEY 
 
The postwar era, and especially the Democrat decade, was a period of intensified 
Incorporation of Turkey into the world capitalist system, not only in the economic field, but 
also in the realms of foreign policy and defence. Turkey in these years became a solid – albeit  
peripheral – part of the political and military structures the United States and its allies built up 
to safeguard the continued existence of democracy and free enterprise in their countries. This 
was a major break with the Kemalist foreign policy of cautious neutralism.(Zücker,  
2004:.235). 
Turkey‟s foreign relations in the postwar period were, of course, dominated by the 
Cold War. We have already seen how the Truman doctrine was formulated in part with 
Turkey in mind. When the Democrats came to power in 1950, Turkey was already a member 
of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and of the Council of Europe. After 
the creation of NATO in 1949, the RPP government had already started to sound out the 
major NATO countries on the possibilities of joining the organization. In August 1950 the 
new government officially applied for membership. Menderes knew that several NATO 
countries, notably the Scandinavian ones, were opposed to Greek and Turkish membership, 
arguing that these countries were neither Atlantic nor democratic, but he thought he had a 
trump card: when the United Nations sent an international expeditionary force to Korea to 
counter the invasion from the north and asked for contributions from member countries to 
stop the invasion in June 1950, Turkey was one of the few countries that immediately offered 
to contribute troops. The first, a brigade of 4500 men, were sent in October and before the 
war was over some 25,000 Turkish soldiers had fought in Korea, suffering more than 6000 
casualties. This action gained Turkey a great deal of credit among NATO governments, but 
even so it was another year before Denmark and Norway, which blocked Turkish entry, were 
finally persuaded to drop their objections. On 18 February 1952 Turkey became a full 
member of NATO. (Zücker, 2004: 235).  
The entry into NATO was celebrated as a great success in Turkey by the Democrats 
and the opposition alike. The reasons for the enthusiasm for NATO were both rational and 
emotional. Rationally, it was seen as a guarantee against Soviet aggression and as 
guaranteeing the flow of Western aid and loans that would make the modernization of Turkey 
possible. Emotionally, it was taken as a sign that Turkey had finally been fully accepted by 
the Western nations on equal terms. This feeling seems to have been fairly widespread. Even 
in the 1970s one could still buy „NATO wine‟ in Turkish restaurants. Turkey‟s membership 
of the Western bloc in the cold war largely determined its position in the two regions of 
which it formed part: the Balkans and the Middle East. The country was a key element in 
Secretary of State Dulles‟s attempts to encircle the Soviet bloc with regional alliances based 
on NATO. 
In the Middle East, the first American attempt to construct a regional alliance was by 
bringing together Turkey and Egypt in 1951–52, but there was very little enthusiasm for this 
option in either country. Relations between Turkey and the Arab countries were strained by 
Turkey‟s stance in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Turkey had at first backed the Arab 
countries because the leadership in Ankara expected the Jewish state to be pro-Soviet. With  
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the warming of American–Israeli relations from 1949 onwards, Turkey also shifted its 
position. It sat with France and the United States on the Palestine Conciliation Commission in 
1949 and recognized Israel diplomatically.(Zücker, 2004:237). After the failure of the 
Turkish–Egyptian alliance, the second attempt to form a regional bloc was a treaty of 
cooperation with Pakistan, concluded in August 1954. In February 1955 this was followed by 
a treaty of cooperation and mutual assistance with Turkey‟s only friend in the Arab world, the 
Kingdom of Iraq under its strongman Nursi al-Said. Great Britain, Iran and Pakistan also 
joined this „ aghdad Pact‟ while the USA received observer status. t is perhaps surprising, in 
view of the bloody history of the years between 1913 and 1923, that the one country with 
which relations were good and stable in the postwar years (and had been since the early 
1930s) was the old enemy, Greece. The relationship stayed good, with both countries joining 
NATO, until the growing crisis in Cyprus, which started to erupt in 1954, shook it to its very 
foundations. (Zücker,  2004: 237). 
However, it has been historically proven that membership in NATO brings lots of 
troubles for domestic Turkey. The year 1958 saw the first signs that all was not what it should 
be between the government and the armed forces. In December 1957, nine army officers were 
arrested for plotting against the government. The arrests were made public on 16 January 
1958. The Democrats had always distrusted the army, because of the close links of its leading 
officers with the old regime and İsmet Pasha in particular, but after a purge of the military 
leadership in 1950 they felt more at ease and, indeed, for the most part of the decade, the top 
echelon of the armed forces seems to have been loyal to the elected government. The trouble 
was that by the late 1950s this no longer guaranteed the government the loyalty of the whole 
officer corps. The reason lay in the fundamental changes wrought by NATO membership and 
US assistance in the armed forces. (Zücker, 2004: 238).   
At the end of the 1940s, the Turkish army was a huge (700,000 strong) manpower-
based force led and organized according to Prussian doctrines of pre-First World War 
vintage. Unbridgeable chasms existed between the recruits, the NCOs and the officers. 
Because the level of technical equipment within the army was extremely low, there was no 
need for large numbers of people with special skills. In the 1950s, all this changed. More than 
$2 billion of military aid was spent on modernizing and mechanizing the Turkish army, and 
American teams assisted in the training of personnel. Younger officers with expertise in 
engineering or communications took up the most vital positions in the army. They often 
received part of their training abroad through NATO exchange programmes and so had a 
chance to see how far behind the Western allies the Turkish army and Turkish society really 
were. We now know that from 1955 onwards plots against the government were hatched in 
these circles. (Zücker, 2004: 239).   
Turkey‟s post-war foreign policy, especially under the Democrats, was perceived as a 
crucial element in their vision to transform Turkey. Thus Fatin Rüstü Zorlu, a career diplomat 
and one of the architects of Turkey‟s foreign policy under Menderes, envisaged new goals for 
his country‟s diplomacy. He saw the principal aims of Turkish diplomacy as not merely to 
end his country‟s isolation and to guarantee its security, but to obtain foreign aid and foreign 
investments to finance the creation of an economic infrastructure. This was to be followed by 
huge investments in industry, with an orientation toward Europe and America, so that  
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agriculture and industry could develop side by side. (Feroz, 2002:118). 
During the Cold War – aside from the possible expectation of the Cyprus intervention 
in 1974 – Turkey was perceived as an important and reliable ally, especially in the NATO 
context, and as a state that never seriously challenged measures at by Washington.(Richard 
Falk, 2014:8). Erbakan fueled these fears (Welfare‟s ultimate aim) by speaking against 
laicism and Westernization and criticizing Turkey‟s military cooperation agreement with 
Israel. He pledged to withdraw Turkey from NATO and the European Union Customs Union 
signed in 1996, in favor of political and economic alliances with other Muslim 
countries.(Jenny White, 2013:40). 
 
...............Turks are a special people. There has always been Turkishness, from 
the beginning of  history. Turkey should be independent economically and 
politically. It should be independent of the United States and of the EU. I 
asked him whether that included NATO. His answer: ”Once we‟re completed  
our duties in Afghanistan, why not?” (Jenny White, 2013:40) 
 
Jenny White found the Turkish officers‟ emphasis on disconnecting Turkey from the world 
disturbing, but when she mentioned this conversation to a liberal, secular Turkish friend of 
her who works in the bazaar, he partly agreed. ” ou have to be part of some agreement like 
NATO, but to be independent, to have no debts, to stand up straight – I can‟t tell you what it 
feels like for a country that‟s been accused of every shit. It gives us back our honor. Honor 
and shame are forms of cultural knowledge widely characteristic of expressions of national 
subjectivity, regardless of the individual‟s political stance.” (Jenny White, 2013:60-61) 
 In 2007, after five years of AKP leadership, elite resistance to EU membership and 
popular fears about the consequences appeared to have gained the upper hand. A 2007 survey 
found that most respondents who identified as upper support for EU membership had 
dropped to 46 percent. Turkish support for NATO also dropped to 35 percent, with an equal 
percentage saying it was no longer essential.(Jenny White, 2013:90) Turkey is no longer the 
poor, self-contained, predominantly peasant community in the „back garden of Europe‟ that it 
was thought to be even as recently as the early 1980s. The opening up of borders, and a new 
zest for commerce inside Turkey itself has transformed this country - a once economically 
unimportant outpost on NATO‟s south-easternmost flank. (Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, 
2011: 3) 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
The developments of the Turkish model in the dynamics in the Middle East were 
received with mixed reactions in the United States. One the one side, it was preferable that 
nations that seemed poised to control the Arab future were oriented toward Turkey, a major 
NATO member with an essentially Western-oriented political outlook. (Richard Falk, 2014: 
14-15). One turning point in Turkey‟s foreign policy came after the anti-Qaddafi uprising in 
Lybia, leading to the regime-changing intervention under NATO auspices in March 2011. 
Ankara was initially ambivalent, but later moved toward accepting the NATO undertaking  
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and eventually seemed to welcome the outcome.  
It can be seen that the Republic of Turkey strive for continuous survival, self-
sufficiency, and modernization is no easy process. International as well as national conflicts, 
including political uneasiness and coups, color Turkey‟s national history following its entry 
to NATO.  Turkey had also manipulated, deteriorated, and eventually repaired its relations 
with the Western democracies and other countries, all for the sake of its own survival and 
internal stability.  esides Turkey‟s foreign relations process, Turkey has also faced the 
dynamics between maintaining the Republic‟s old way of governance and the new ones. The 
contrast between Menderes‟ and Türke ‟s governance has showed us the conflicting interests 
between Turkey‟s aim for progress (inter alia „being Europe‟ by keeping its identity as a 
NATO member) and the need to maintain popularity in catering the local‟s views. Once 
again, ensuring state‟s security, economic, and political program were the government‟s main 
interests - and a stable political situation was the prerequisite. Turkey also originally insisted 
on membership in NATO, not merely for their international reputation and Westernization 
agenda, but also for the need for defense against possible Soviet aggression.  
Therefore, It was rather unwise to create a dichotomy between Turkey‟s international 
relations and its domestic politics. However, it was shown that when the two areas were 
enabled to work hand in hand, there arose a potential betterment  both for Turkey and for the 
rest of the international society - in this case, fellow NATO member states. Thus, reflecting 
from Turkey‟s historical development within NATO, Turkey is a less practically beneficial 
country for NATO now and simultaneously, NATO is no longer an essential need for Turkey, 
as Turkey has gained more self-confidence internationally and being no longer reliant on 
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